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A REPORT ON ONE-MAN POLICE PATROL CARS IN
KANSAS CITY, MISSOURI
BERNARD C. BRANNON
Bernard C. Brannon, Chief of Police, Kansas City, Missouri, presented the findings
of this report at the 62nd Annual Conference of the International Association of Chiefs
of Police, which was held last October in Philadelphia. Chief Brannon, who has been
an advocate of progressive police methods since assuming his present office, has super-
vised the long period of investigation and experimentation that his department has
carried on in their conversion from the two-man to one-man police patrol car. His
report, which is published in full, sets forth the various modifications that they have
found necessary to successfully handle this new program.-EDITOa.
Prior to the use of automobiles in patrol work the police beats or patrol areas
were covered by foot patrolmen. Usually, they walked their beats alone, but some-
times in pairs when the amount and nature of police incidents required it.
Since the advent of the motorized patrol, the traditional procedure has been
to assign two officers to each automobile. There were good reasons for this, for
not only were the patrol areas greatly enlarged, scattering the officers over a greater
geographic area and making them less susceptible to assistance from fellow officers,
but the ability to surveil and detect misbehavior correspondingly increased, bring-
ing on a work load considered too heavy for one man.
Then too, the complexity of our civilization increased, much faster, no doubt,
than the ability of the police to cope with the rising crime rates on even ground.
While the automobile opened new avenues for police progress, it also gave birth to
an avalanching category of new police problems. Separated from his fellow officer
not by blocks as before but by miles, the motorized policeman reasonably considered
it foolhardy and dangerous to tackle his patrolling assignment alone, and police
administrators were in agreement. To the argument that the foot patrolman walked
alone so why could not the motorized patrolman singularly accomplish his job,
these answers and many more were supplied.
Then came the development of the radio. With the possible exception of the
automobile, radio communications bestowed on the policeman his greatest weapon
for effectively fighting crime and preserving the peace. Pairing radio with the auto-
mobile created a boon to law enforcement undreamed of a few short years ago.
But the real progress had only started. Next came improvement in radio communi-
cations which permitted the patrolling officer to reply to his dispatcher, to relay
information, to request assistance, and to receive it often in a matter of seconds.
This was our two-way radio. Yet there was more progress ahead.
When car to car radio communication was announced the police administrator
knew he had cracked the distance barrier. That is, he realized that three-way radio
brought the patrol cars closer together in point of effectiveness than were the foot
patrolmen who could often whistle or yell at one another within the close proximity
of their beats. He came to reason that there was no substantial difference between
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the motorized patrolman who could rapidly converse with his fellow patrolman in a
neighboring beat, and the predecessor foot patrolman who would call to his asso-
ciate by whistle or night stick beating on the pavement. Indeed, if there were a
difference it was only that the radio-motorized policeman held all the advantages,
all of the safety factors that come with swifter and surer communication.
Those who advocated abolition of the traditional two-man patrol cars in favor
of one-man cars even before the remarkable advances of radio could now speak in
louder voice. Where before they argued that the officer riding alone was more alert,
more careful, more observant, and thereby not only more efficient but personally
safer, they now could maintain with authority that the risks of walking alone and
riding alone were equalized. For with two and three-way radio communications
the solitary patrolman had swift, certain, and effective companionship. Arguments
against one-man patrol cars noticeably dwindled.
In Kansas City, Missouri, we came to the conclusion that it was time to reappraise
past decisions as to the use of one-man cars. Commencing in June, 1953, after in-
tensive study and consideration, a gradual transition came about. On December 1,
1953, the Kansas City Missouri Police Department effected a complete 24-hour
changeover from the traditional two officers to a patrol car to the one-man system,
becoming the largest city in the United States to do so.
Numerous inquiries relative to the change were received. These inquiries multi-
plied as the months went by, interest being manifested even in cities of other lands.
If we were to fulfill our obligation of exchanging police information for the better-
ment of the law enforcement service, it became evident that a report of some kind
must be made. But, in keeping with the Department's dedication to the dispensa-
tion of only the most authentic and informative data, it was deemed necessary
to withhold a report until sufficient time had elapsed to permit the presentation of
comparative statistics.
To accomplish this it was decided to wait until the entire calendar year of 1954
had expired, for this would culminate a full year's operation under the one-man
car police patrol. Because the conversion to one-man cars was commenced on a
partial and gradual basis in 1953, chronologically the closest year of operation
under the two-man car system was 1952. Therefore, the comparative statistics set
forth herein will encompass the full 12 month period of 1952, when the total patrol
work was performed by two-man cars, and 1954, when the same work was carried
out solely under the one-man system.
It is hoped that those who received no reply to their inquiries will accept the reason
for the delay in making this report. Also, the Department realizes that since it has
adopted the one-man car operational procedure as a matter of its administrative
choice, its views in the form of conclusions as to success or failure could be weighed
for biasness or partiality and interpreted in light of a possible vindication of its
decision. For this reason a: deliberate effort to avoid personal judgment or state
conclusions has been made. The facts should speak for themselves. Our sole objective
is to provide frank and honest data which may be of value to the police administrator
in his study of the applicability of the one-man patrol cars to his particular city and
department.
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EFFECTING CHANGE TO ONE-MAN CARS
Preliminary Matters
Consideration was given to the possibility of changing from two-man patrol
cars to one-man cars solely as an effort to obtain greater police service for Kansas
City, Missouri, without (1) increasing the hazards of police employment or other-
wise adversely affecting the personal safety of the officer, (2) increasing workload
of the individual officer beyond fair and reasonable standards, nor (3) increasing
costs of operations beyond fair budgetary limitations.
The safety factor of the individual officer was the objective of intensive study.
Not only was the Department deeply concerned with the personal safety and wel-
fare of its employees, but it was only logical to anticipate that the one-man patrol
system would crumble within and without the Department if the personal risk to the
patrolman was increased. Proponents of the one-man patrol operation have long
argued that not only is there no greater risk to the officer riding alone but that he
is actually safer than when paired with a fellow officer. It was concluded that if
the patrolman was physically and mentally prepared, adequately trained and
thoroughly schooled in strict compliance with one-man car procedures, and re-
assigned to a patrol area and workload determined according to new calculations,
the question of personal safety would be favorably resolved.
Personal factors were not overlooked. Such questions were asked as: How many
patrolmen were available for one-man car operations? What was the average age?
Were they young enough to grasp the new idea and support it? Would they be
too set in their ways to embrace such a drastic change? What was the intellectual
level and was it indicative of the general ability to assume added responsibilities
and to comprehend fully the detailed procedures that would have to be followed?
The attitude of the patrolmen toward one-man cars was noted and explanatory
methods of overcoming resistance to the idea were worked out. So too, the super-
visory officers were canvassed as to their initial opinions. With proper explanation
would they accept the new system willingly and with open mind, or would they re-
ject it, either openly or latently?
Statistics setting forth the number and nature of other cities operating under
one-man patrol cars or a combination of one and two-man cars were collected. Argu-
ments for and against the idea were impartially and carefully analyzed. Personal
opinions of other police administrators with experience in one-man car operations
were sought. (See Table I.)
The cost factor loomed as a formidable problem. Assuming an increase in police
service, would that increase carry with it a purchase price too great for justification?
There would be substantial expenditures attached to the conversion, for, even if the
numerical strength of the patrol force remained constant, there would be an increase
in patrol areas or beats brought on through a reduction in the size of present ones,
and this would mean more cars, more automobile maintenance, more car accessories,
a greater taxing of communications and consequent radio expenses. It was also





Number of Two Man Cars One and Two One Man Car
Population Group Cities R og Only Man Only
Motor Patrol
Number I % Number % NumberI %
MANNING O POLICE PATROL CA s IN CnaEs OvER 10,000 (1953)1
Cities over 500,000 ................ 16 6 37.5 10 62.5 0 0
250,000 to 500,000 ................ 21 8 38.1 13 61.9 0 0
100,000 to 250,000................ 61 28 45.9 28 45.9 5 8.2
50,000 to 100,000 ................. 119 48 40.4 57 47.8 14 11.8
25,000 to 50,000 .................. 260 91 35.0 120 46.2 49 18.8
10,000 to 25,000 .................. 679 174 25.6 356 52.6 149 21.8
All Cities over 10,000 .......... 1156 355 30.7 584 50.5 217 18.8
MANNING OF POLICE PATROL CARS IN CITIEs--OvER 10,000 (1954)2
Cities over 500,000 ................ 17 8 47.1 9 52.9 0 0.0
250,000 to 500,000 ................ 21 5 23.8 15 71.4 1 4.8
100,000 to 250,000 ................ 58 23 39.7 30 51.7 5 8.6
50,000 to 100,000 ................. 106 38 35.9 58 54.7 10 9.4
25,000 to 50,000 .................. 249 69 27.7 130 52.2 50 20.1
10,000 to 25,000 .................. 594 122 20.5 364 61.3 108 18.2
All Cities Over 10,000 ......... 1045 265 25.4 606 58.0 174 16.6
1 The Municipal Year Book 1953: International City-Manager's Association; Table V, p. 419.
2 The Municipal Year Book 1954: International City-Manager's Association; Table V, p. 433.
Need for the establishment of a special training program was apparent. Both the
patrolmen and their supervisors would have to receive extensive education and
training in one-man car procedures. The Department would be totally remiss in its
duty if it failed to provide substantial preconversion training as well as continuing
training after the plan went into effect. While it was contemplated that the trial
and error method would be a great teacher, the Department was determined to do
all within its power to foresee and anticipate the mistakes that could be made and
to correct them before they happened.
The public was not forgotten in the educational approach. Samples of public
opinion of one-man patrol cars were gathered. Results were sufficiently clear to
indicate that the public as well as departmental personnel would require some selling
of the new procedure. But it was reasonable to assume that the finest public salesman-
ship would be the enhanced police service the citizens of Kansas City would receive.
There was no error in this prediction.
Thus, it was that the theory of one-man patrol cars invaded the Kansas City Police
Department. That it gathered momentum as the studies and research continued is
obvious from the final administrative choice. The decision was to adopt the system,
and the administration thereby stuck its neck out. But the neck sticking was not a
sudden thrust-it was" a well-prepared, gradual thrusting that permitted careful




The three police districts of Kansas City were made up of 24 patrol areas or beats.
Each patrol area was policed by one car with two patrolmen, and the 24-hour period
was divided into three eight-hour shifts. During the peak workload period from
8:00 P.M. to 4:00 A.M. additional patrolling officers were provided. The patrol
areas lacked much needed readjustment as to geographical size, population, and
workload factors, although constant surveys and studies were commenced during the
new administration in 1952.
The Department did not accept the reasoning that the old patrol areas could be
left undisturbed and that one man policing the same area could operate as effectively
as two men to a car. Conversely, it was reasoned that one man assigned to the same
patrol area previously policed by two officers in the car could result in decreased
police service while at the same time increasing the hazards affecting the individual
safety of the officer.
Consequently, it was decided to re-district the patrol areas and rearrange them
into smaller ones justified by size, population, and police incidents. As nearly as
possible the change in patrol areas followed the census tracts, for it was thought
that some socio-economic data compiled by government sources would be of value
in orienting the patrolman as to his area of operation.
The 24 areas were reduced in size and realigned so that the city was then divided
into 41 patrol areas. (See Figure 1.) Extensive workload data was compiled as to
each area before the changes in the patrol areas were made. Plans were then made
to assign a one-man car to each new patrol area. But this was not to take place at
once.
The Gradual Conversion
Once the decision was made to attempt the conversion it was further decided that
the change must be gradual. The following reasons for avoiding a hasty introduction
of one-man patrols were advanced:
1. Patrolmen and their supervisors would be given a better opportunity to adjust
their thinking and actions to one-man operations, and acceptance of the new
idea would be more likely.
2. A gradual transition would permit a more thorough study, enhancing the
chances of true evaluation, with accompanying modifications and improve-
ments.
3. Radio dispatchers would become acclimated to their increased responsibility
and would more readily adapt to new procedures necessary.
4. The public would be given a preview of the new system and could gradually
formulate a more valid opinion of the service being received.
After initial training courses in one-man car procedures, tactics, and background
information, the system was placed in partial operation in June, 1953. The first
tests were conducted only during daylight hours at No. 3 Station, referred to in
Kansas City as the Sheffield Station. On July 1, 1953, all patrol areas in this district






The map above left shows the police districts and car beats under the old system of two-man car
operation. The city was divided into 24 car beats.
The map at the right shows the increased patrol effidency under one-man car opertion-a total
of 41 car beats each watch, with 12 additional cars operating from 8 p.m. to 4 a.m.
The areas outlined in dotted lines represent annexations to the city which will become effective as
follows: Areas marked B become part of Kansas Cityin 1957; those marked C will be annexed in 1958,
and those marked A in 1959. The annexation of these areas will give Kansas City a total of 129.83.
The present area is 81.72, and Kansas City will be 48.11 square miles larger in area in 1959. This
will mean new problems in policing.
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conversion of the then No. 4 Station and District on a 24-hour basis.1 Effective De-
cember 1, 1953, the entire city area was included in the one-man patrol system on
a 24-hour basis.
During the peak workload period from 8:00 P.M. to 4:00 A.M. 12 additional
patrol cars were placed in operation throughout the city, these, too, being one-man
cars.
Communications. The Department regarded radio communications as the heart-
beat of one-man patrol. A three-tone system was developed and placed in operation
as an added alert to all officers. One tone indicated a general pickup order was about
to be transmitted. The two tone signal was notice that two or more cars were about
to be alerted for dispatching on a call. Three-tone signals signified a call of extreme
or major importance was about to be dispatched.
Tape recordings were used at all times for the maintenance of a permanent record
of all transmissions of the dispatcher and mobile units. To insure the most efficient
operation of the recordings (for it was thought necessary that extra care be taken
to record all oral communications in the event of death or injury to a patrolman in a
one-man car), two of the latest model Dictaphone Recording Machines were installed
in the dispatching room. Car to car radio transmissions are also recorded here.
Size of Patrol Areas. After the complete conversion to one-man cars took place
the wisdom of the prior decision to decrease the size of the patrol areas as a requisite
step in the change to one-man cars was confirmed. When the Department operated
on the two-man car basis the average size of the patrol areas was 3.4 square miles;
after the conversion to one-man patrolling and the increase in the number of patrol
areas from 24 to 41, the average size of the areas was reduced to 1.9 square miles.
Almost immediately the public became aware of greater police speed in answering
calls. A study revealed there was an average reduction in time of answering calls
from three and one-half minutes to two minutes.
In effect, the patrol areas had been reduced to about half of their original size.
This enabled the patrolman to more closely surveil his beat, giving it attention that
previously was impossible. It also permitted him to carry on his work with the realiza-
tion that he was not riding his old patrol area alone-his fellow officer was still there,
but in an additional car.
The Patrol Cars. To provide the coverage required by the creation of new patrol
areas, 16 new automobiles were purchased. Table II sets forth the cost involved.
The Department uses standard Ford automobiles, either tudor or fordor, with fordo-
matic transmissions. At $2,130 each the new cars required an expenditure of $34,080.
A motor pool was established utilizing all department vehicles not in use on a
24-hour basis. This resulted in sufficient additional cars to provide the 12 cars as-
signed to the peak workload period.
Patrol cars were made more conspicuous by painting them white with the police
identification in large black letters on the sides. Almost immediately the public
started complimenting the Department for "having a patrol car around their house
so much". Actually, the black car used previously was probably not noticed with the
This became No. 2 station after elimination of the prior No. 2 station in July, 1953.
[Val. 47




The change over to a single motorized patrol force required the purchasing and equipping of
sixteen additional automobiles.
Shown below is the itemized cost involved for supplementary equipment necessary to inaugurate
the one-man patrol car system.
Cost of additional equipment for change from two to one-man cars
Item Cost Each Number Purchased Total Cost
Automobile ..................... $2130.00 16 $34,080.00
Seat Covers (Patrol Cars) ......... 9.50 10 95.00
Seat Covers ..................... 20.00 6 102.00
Generators ...................... 152.66 16 2,442.56
Redlight (Dome) ................ 26.55 10 265.50
Redlight (Side) .................. 4.98 10 49.80
Gun Rack ...................... 20.20 60 1,212.00
Siren ........................... 71.25 16 1,114.00
Tags ........................... 2.00 16 32.00
Decals ......................... 3.50 10 35.00
Three way radio ................. 598.75 16 9,580.00
Speaker (Outside) ................ 11.90 60 714.00
Blanket .................. ..... 4.40 10 44.00
Tarp ........................... 8.50 10 85.00
Rope (200 Ft.) .................. 7.72 10 77.20
First Aid Kit .................... 5.67 16 90.72
Total Cost ....... $50,018.78
frequency indicated after the change in color, although there were, of course, more
patrol cars on the streets.
Motor Car Equipment. Uniform patrol vehicles were all equipped with three-way
FM radio. Three-way radio accomplished its purpose. (1).It proved a significant
safety factor in enabling the officer to summon immediate assistance of patrol cars
in neighboring areas; (2) gave a feeling of security to the officer riding alone; and (3)
tended to alleviate the work load of the radio dispatchers, making additional air
time available. An additional outside radio speaker was installed behind the grill
work of each patrol car. The speakers are controlled by a toggle switch mounted on
the dashboard of the car, permitting the patrolman to hear his radio calls while
outside of his car performing a foot patrol function. Repeat calls have diminished as
a result of this installation.
Each patrol car is equipped with a 12 gauge Remington riot gun. With the adop-
tion of the one-man patrol system the former overhead shot gun brackets were
replaced with a new type Fletcher gun holder making it more accessible to the
officer. The riot gun is now placed in a vertical position beside the driver, and the
Fletcher Gun holder protects against theft by a paracentric key lock,, one that pre-
vents removal of the gun without the proper key. Facilitating immediate use, the
automatic release permits instant access to the gun.
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A red flashing dome light is mounted on each uniform patrol car as a supplement
to the red light located on the left side of the car. Its value is being proven as an
alert to motorists during emergency runs and also when used in stopping pursued
vehicles.
The Costs
The cost of the new cars together with the additional equipment amounted to
$50,018.78. With more police cars in operation on a 24-hour basis, the cost of re-
pairing, servicing, and refueling the motor fleet of the Department increased. Table
III sets out these items in a comparison of the years 1952 and 1954. Examination of
this table will reveal that purely maintenance costs, exlcuding depreciation, are
$163,461.25 for 1952, during two-man car operations, and $222,291.79 for 1954.
This is an increase of 27 percent. It will also be observed that the number of motor
cars subject to maintenance increased from 128 to 148, to the present time, or a
percentage increase of 14 per cent.
As a natural corollary to the acquisition of more vehicles the item of depreciation
increased from $46,947.53 to $72,514.87. This operational cost when added to the
maintenance cost shows a total increase over 1952 of $87,939.76.
In explanation of the increased maintenance costs, other than the normal ex-
pectancy arising from 20 more vehicles being placed in use and the normal increase
in all costs over a two-year period, is the fact that the patrol force traveled 1,277,762
miles during 1952 and 2,777,460 miles in 1954, a numerical increase of 1,499,698
Table III
COMPARATIVE OPERITIONAL AND MAINTENANCE COSTS
1952 1954 Increase or Decrease
Payroll (Automobile Mechanics only) ...... $65,551.60 $86,315.77 +$20,764.14
Parts Installed .......................... 21,411.66 31,726.28 +10,314.62
Other Maintenance and Fleet Items ........ 9,009.62 14,341.68 +5,332.06
Tires and Tubes ......................... 8,118.34 7,464.43 *-649.91
Motor Oil Used .......................... 1,168.18 1,399.26 +231.08
Gasoline ................................ 58,201.85 81,044.37 +22,842.52
Depreciation ............................ 46,947.53 72,514.87 +25,567.34
Sub Total .......................... 210,408.78 294;806.66 +84,397.88
Other Operational Costs (Lights, Heat,
Water, Motorcycles, etc.) ............... 44,443.37 47,985.25 +3,541.88
Total ........................... $254,852.15 $343,791.91 +$87,939.76
Number of Motor Cars ................... 128 148 +20
Cost of Additional Motor Cars ............ . - $34,080.00 +$34,080.00
Mileage (All Vehicles) .................... 3,379,235 4,390,171 +1,010,936
Mileage (Patrol Bureau Only) .............. 1,277,262 2,777,460 +1,499,698




PART I CL.ASSIFICATION OFFENSES
2 Year Comparative Figures
Kansas City Missouri Police Department
Numerical Percentage
1952 1954 Increase or Increase or
Decrease Decrease
Murder & Non-Negligent Manslaughter ......... 42 45 +3 +7.14
Manslaughter by Negligence ................... 18 21 +3 +16.67
Rape ....................................... 76 60 -16 -21.05
Robbery .................................... 490 372 -118 -24.08
Aggravated Assault ........................... 492 340 -152 -30.89
Burglary .................................... 2050 1194 -856 -41.76
Larceny ($50 & Over) ........................ 1687 1179 -508 -30.11
Larceny (Under $50) .......................... .2760 2548 -212 -7.68
Auto Theft .................................. 664 822 +158 +23.80
Total ................................... 8279 6581 -1698 -20.51
miles, or an increase of 117.37 per cent. This amazing increase in activity should
be studied in relation to the results obtained.
In addition to the cost of new vehicles and the operational and maintenance ex-
pense, additional costs may be reasonably anticipated in communications and in
the police garage. Both appear to be operating well at the present time, but an en-
enlargement of staffs and some physical facilities may be necessary. These are cost
factors that must be carefully studied in appraising the patrol system.
RsuLrTs
Crime Rate
Table IV is a two-year comparison of Part I Classification Offenses. There was a
numerical decrease in the total of these offenses from 8279 to 6581, or 1698; a per-
Table V
PART I CrAssIFICATIoN OFFENsEs
2 Year Comparative Figures
1952 1954
Actual Cleared Percent Actual Cleared Percent
cnses by Cleared OessA~ la9ffene byes Cleared offenses Arrest
Murder & Non-Negligent Manslaughter ........ 42 37 88.1% 45 43 95.6%
Manslaughter by Negligence .................. 18 17 94.4% 21 21 100.0%
Rape .................................. 76 47 61.8% 60 46 76.7%
Robbery ................................... 490 262 53.5% 372 338 90.9%
Aggravated Assault .......................... 492 412 83.7% 340 318 93.5%
Burglary ......................... .......... 2050 498 24.3% 1194 671 56.2%
Larceny ($50 & Over): ...................... 1687 228 13.4% 1179 323 27.4%
Larceny ($50 & Under) ...................... 2760 425 15.4% 2548 654 25.7%
Auto Theft ................................. 664 240 36.1% 822 333 40.5%




PART II CLASSIFICATION ARRESTS
Kansas City Missouri Police Department
Numerical Percentage
1952 Arrests 1954 Arrests Increase or Increase or
Decrease Decrease
Other Assaults .............................. 161 275 +114 +70.8%
Forgery and Counterfeiting ................... 63 62 -1 -1.6%
Embezzlement and Fraud .................... 172 300 +128 +74.4%
Stolen Property ............................. 41 95 +54 +131.7%
Concealed Weapons.......................... 252 335 +83 +32.9%
Prostitution and Commercialized Vice .......... 362 345 -17 -4.7%
Sex Offenses ................................ 323 289 -34 -10.5%
Offenses Against Family & Children ........... 352 439 +87 +24.7%
Narcotic Drug Laws ......................... 79 134 +55 +69.6%
Liquor Laws ................................ 623 284 -339 -54.4%
Drunkenness ................................ 18073 17069 -1004 -5.56%
Disorderly Conduct .......................... 4253 4681 +428 +10.1%
Vagrancy................................... 983 1494 +511 +52.0%
Gambling .................................. 2165 1779 -386 -17.8%
Driving While Intoxicated .................... 2597 2344 -253 -9.7%
Road and Driving Laws ...................... 31000 33022 +2022 +6.5%
Parking Violations* .......................... 138 17 -121 -87.7%
Other Traffic and Vehicle Laws ............... 2196 3313 +1117 +50.9%
All Other offenses ........................... 3955 3041 -914 -23.1%
Suspicion ................................... 951 1030 +79 +8.3%
Total .................................. 68739 70348 +1609 +2.3%
Total Less Suspicion ................. 67788 69318 +1530 +2.3%
Parking Tickets ............................. 120404 128798 +8394 +6.97%
* Arrests, not Tickets.
centage decrease of 20.51 per cent. These statistics are carefully kept in accordance
with the requirements of the Uniform Crime Reports as requested by the Federal
Bureau of Investigation and concurred in by the International Association of Chiefs
of Police.
According to the Annual Bulletin of the Federal Bureau of Investigation's "Uni-
form Crime Reports", the National Average Crime Rate increased 6% in 1953 over
1952 and 5 % in 1954 over 1953. For the same periods in Kansas City there was
respectively a 7% decrease in 1953 and a 14.5 % decrease in 1954.
In Kansas City Part I Offenses cleared by arrest in 1952 were 26.2 %, and in 1954
the clearance percentage had been increased to 41.7. (See Table V.)
Table VI is a comparison of Part II Offenses 1952 and 1954. As is standard pro-
cedure in reporting Part II Offenses in approximately 71 % of the incidents, the
arrest report serves the dual purpose of a complaint report. Necessarily, therefore,
in this type of Part II Offenses, reporting is based on arrests.




2 YEAR Co lPARA~ivE TRrc FiouRms
Numerical Percentage
1952 1954 Increase or Increase or
Decrease Decrease
Accidents ....... :................. 11,939 12,968 +1,029 +8.62
Persons Killed ...................... 31 38 +7 +22.58
Persons Injured .................... 1,333 1,771 +440 +33.06
Traffic Arrests ..................... 39,482 42,728 +3,246 +8.22
Convictions ........................ 33,194 36,059 +2,865 +8.63
Dismissed or Discharged ............. 6,288 6,669 +381 +6.06
Traffic Fines ........................ .$00,191 $437,773 +$37,582 +9.39
Registered Motor Vehicles ............ 144,715 164,705 +19,990 +13.81
ment and Fraud, Sex Offenses, Arson, Vandalism, and Lost Property, etc., pre-
liminary complaint reports are normally made. Therefore, when our records show
68,739 Part 11 Offenses for 1953 and 70,348 for 1954, the 1,609 numerical or 2.3
percentage increase indicates principally more police activity through a greater
number of arrests in the Part 11 classification.
Traffic
Table VII is a two year comparison of traffic data. The variables present in the
traffic situation are well known to all police administrators. Especially important is
the constant increase in the number of motor vehicles that daily travel the streets.
There were 3,246 more arrests in 1954, but the accident rate increased 8.62 %. There
were 2,865 more traffic convictions with $37,582.15 increase in fines.
Safety of Officer
The Department is pleased to announce that the inauguration of one-man patrol
cars brought but slight increase in injuries to the patrolmen as the result of police
Table VIII
IN jRms, LTNE op Durv
Patrol Bureau
Numerical
1952 1954 Increase Or
Decrease
Assaults Upon Officers ....................... 11 17 +6
Vehicular Accidents (Police Cars) ............. 12 11 -1
Other Injuries .............................. 7 10 +3
Totals ................................. 30 38 + 8
Assault Upon Officers Per Patrol Unit ......... .458 .415 -. 043
Vehicular Accidents Per Unit ................. .5 .268 - .232
Other Injuries Per Unit ...................... .292 .244 - .048




INCIDENTS Or RESISTING ARREST
Operation 1954 Numerical Increase Percentage Increase
2-Man Operation 1952 -Man Oor Decrease or Decrease
January .............. 0 18 +18 +100.00%
February............. 0 14 +14 +100.00%
March ............... 0 10 +10 +100.00%
April ................ 0 4 +4 +100.00%
May ................. 1 5 +4 +400.00%
June ................. 0 12 +12 +100.00%
July ................. 0 11 +11 +100.00%
August .............. 9 7 -2 -22.00%
September ............ 18 7 -11 -61.11%
October .............. 27 8 -19 -70.37%
November ............ 13 8 -5 -38.46%
December ............ 15 7 -8 -53.33%
Year Total ....... 83 111 +28 +33.73%
1953 1955
January .............. 8 14 +6 +75.0%
February ............. 5 6 +1 +20.0%
March ............... 20 10 -10 -50.0%
April ................ 17 8 -9 -52.9%
May ................. 16 19 +3 +18.8%
June ................. .. 7 6 - 1 -14.3%
6 Month Total.... 73 63 -10 -13.7%
activity, and there have been no deaths. In 1952 the total number of men injured in
all types of incidents, in line of duty, during patrol was 30, and this increased to 38
for 1954. None of these injuries were severe. Thus far the individual safety factor in
one-man patrols presents no problem. See Table VIII for types of injuries and in-
juries per patrol unit.
Resisting Arrest
Incidents of resisting arrest are difficult to tabulate with accuracy because the
officer does not always fully report them. This is usually due to the wide variation
in the nature and degree of such resistance. If it is a minor one, it may or may not be
reported, depending on how the officer views it. Then too, if a charge of resisting arrest
is not filed against the arrestee, it may not reach the official records. However, on
the basis of available records for the years 1952 and 1954, there appears to be 28
more incidents of resisting arrest reported in the latter year. Of interest (See Table
IX) is the fact that for the last five months of 1954 the number of incidents were
lower than the corresponding period of 1952 and for 1955 the six month total is
13.7 % under same period in 1953. This in spite of the fact that the crime rate and




COMPARATIVE PATROL WORK LOAD DATA
Numerical Percentage
1952 1954 Increase or Increase or
Decrease Decrease
Calls Received ..................... 86,969 165,794 +78,825 +90.64
Car Checks ........................ 26,421 98,197 +71,776 +271.66
Pedestrian Checks .................. 17,218 92,698 +75,480 +438.38
Residence Checks .................. 5,230 25,459 +20,229 +386.79
Building Checks .................... 285,437 856,312 +570,875 +200.00
Open Doors Found ................. 254 811 +557 +214.17
Open Windows Found .............. 280 884 +604 +215.71
Reports Taken ..................... 21,146 41,940 +20,794 +98.33
Warrants Served ................... 845 6,129 +5,284 +625.33
Arrests ............................ 25,733 39,607 +13,874 +53.92
Tickets Issued ..................... 29,080 48,899 +19,819 +68.15
Accidents Investigated .............. 5,021 8,626 +3,605 +69.81
Miles Traveled ..................... 1,277,762 2,777,460 +1,499,698 +117.37
don, if not speculation, that the patrolmen were becoming more proficient in the
operation of one-man cars and were cooperating as a team in making their arrests.
Patrol Activity
Table X should prove of great interest. The items of patrol activity jumped so
greatly over 1952 that recorded results are admittedly amazing. Within a range of
438.79 percent increase in the total of pedestrians checked to a 53.9 percent increase
in arrests, the step-up in patrol activity appears to be more than doubled.
As before stated, the greater efficiency in answering calls (a decrease in the time
element of one and- one-half minutes) brought public acknowledgment and much
praise. The fact that two cars would often appear in answer to a call convinced many
persons that they were being given more police protection. Adding to this the fact
that the patrol cars were painted the conspicuous white color, the reason for the
complete acceptance of the one-man car system by the public of Kansas City,
Missouri, is understandable.
To place the same number of patrol units in the field on a two-man car basis would
necessitate the employment of 152 additional officers at a cost of $592,800 annually.
A further expenditure for uniforms would add $46,500.
PRESENT STUDIES
Since little more than a year and a half has passed since the Department adopted
and put into operation the complete one-man car system of patrol, studies in all
directions are being carried on. Of particularinterest is the element of the individual
2As this article was going to press the complete data for 1955 has become available covering all
of the statistics appearing in the tables of this report- Readers who are interested in these com-
parative figures can obtain them by writing the author.
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workload. Checks are being made as to the personal effect, physically, emotionally,
etc., if any, upon the officers working alone. No facts accumulated to date indicate
change in regard to these factors as a result of solo policing. In fact, to the contrary
there are indications that the officer working alone is divorced from personality
clashes and pressures that often were present when he worked with another officer.
At present a study is being completed as to the workload of each patrol area, and
an average percentage workload is being compiled. The extent to which each patrol
area varies from the average workload is being analyzed as a possible criterion of the
need to further adjust the patrol area boundaries.
Of course, the passage of additional time will lead the Department to safer and
sounder conclusions as to its one-man patrol system, and when the time element
justifies the advancement of definite conclusions by the administration a further
report in greater detail will be issued.
